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ORME, Judge: 
The 49th Street Galleria seeks our review of a decision by 
the Utah State Tax Commission requiring the collection of a sales 
tax by the Galleria on fees collected for "admission" to its 
batting cages, laser tag game, and roller skating rink under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-103 (1992).! We reverse on the.basis that no 
1. The applicable statute provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
(1) There is levied a tax on the 
purchaser for the amount paid or charged for 
the following: 
(continued...) 
admission fee, of the sort contemplated in the statute, is 
charged by the Galleria. 
FACTS 
In 1984, the Galleria opened for business as an indoor 
entertainment mall in Murray, Utah. The mall houses arcade 
games, video machines, a bowling alley, a miniature golf course, 
amusement rides, roller skating, batting and pitching cages, food 
concessions, and laser tag.2 The public may enter the Galleria 
without charge, and tables and seats are placed throughout the 
mall for the public to use free of charge. Fees are assessed 
only when an individual decides to participate in one of the many 
available activities. 
Turning to the activities at issue in this case, a batting 
cage consists of a fenced area containing a machine that pitches 
baseballs or softballs to customers standing within the cage. 
The machine is operated either by tokens or by cash payment to an 
attendant. An individual pays to have the ball delivered by the 
machine. A fee is not charged for simply entering the batting 
cage and, indeed, coaches are allowed to stand in the cage and 
advise the batter without paying an admission charge. 
1. (...continued) 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation, including 
seats and tables reserved or otherwise, 
and other similar accommodations[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992). 
The audit that resulted in the imposition of tax liability 
was for the period of July 1, 1986, through June 30, 1989. The 
substantive law then in effect governs this dispute. Chicago 
Bridge & Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 
1992). Nonetheless, both parties cite to the 1992 version of the 
Utah Code Annotated. That version is identical to the law in 
effect for the period from January 1, 1987, to the present. 
However, between July 1, 1986, and January 1, 1987, the statutory 
language was more succinct and simply stated that the tax was due 
on any "amount paid for admission to any place of" amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation.11 Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(1) (d) 
(Supp. 1986). Since the instant case does not involve facts 
contemplated by the statutory language added as of January 1, 
1987, we follow the parties' lead in citing the current version 
of the code. 
2. Laser tag was not offered when the Galleria first opened and 
has since been discontinued, but it was offered during the period 
of the audit. 
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The record contains a less detailed description of laser 
tag, but indicates it is operated in a manner similar to the 
batting cages. The Tax Commission's findings state that "[u]pon 
payment of a cash fee, customers were provided laser guns and 
sensing devices and engaged in mock combat in an enclosed area." 
In the roller skating operation, an individual is allowed to 
"skate for a period of time upon payment of cash," while parents 
and other onlookers may enter the skating facility and observe 
without charge* 
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the Auditing 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission to determine whether 
the Galleria's activities would be subject to Utah sales tax. 
Kenneth Cook of the Auditing Division informed the Galleria that 
receipts from the batting cages and roller skating rink would be 
subject to tax, while, apparently, fees for bowling and miniature 
golf would not be. The Galleria then sought additional review. 
In August of 1984, George M. Loertscher of the Auditing Division 
informed the Galleria that roller skating, batting cages, 
miniature golf, and bowling were not subject to sales tax. 
Relying on Loertscher's letter, the Galleria did not collect 
sales tax on the activities identified.3 When the Galleria 
subsequently added laser tag to its repertoire of amusements, it 
continued its consistent practice of not collecting sales tax on 
these activities. 
Some years later, the Auditing Division undertook a routine 
compliance audit. This time it was determined that the Galleria 
was required to collect an admission tax on fees collected for 
use of its batting cages, roller skating rink, and laser tag 
amusement, but not on the corresponding fees for bowling and 
miniature golf. The Galleria sought agency review of the 
assessment and the Tax Commission, in a decision dated November 
20, 1991, held that fees for use of the batting cages, roller 
skating, and laser game were payments for "admission" subject to 
sales tax.4 The Galleria then sought reconsideration, and the 
3. Equipment rental is a separate matter. The Galleria has 
routinely collected sales tax on the rental of bowling shoes and 
roller skates by those patrons who do not provide their own 
equipment. The taxability of such transactions is not in issue. 
4. Because of the conflicting advice provided by the Auditing 
Division, the Tax Commission held that the Galleria would not be 
liable for the tax due on the roller skating and batting cage 
receipts during the period of the audit, but only prospectively. 
The Tax Commission now argues that because the tax is not 
being assessed against roller skating and batting cage receipts 
for the audit period, the issue is moot and any decision on the 
(continued.••) 
omn(;*5-p» * 
Tax Commission denied that request by decision dated March 10, 
1992.5 The Galleria now seeks judicial review of the Tax 
Commission's determination that fees for the use of the batting 
cages, roller skating rink, and laser tag game are subject to 
Utah sales tax under Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992). 
JURISDICTION 
Before addressing the merits of this case, we must first 
determine whether the petition for judicial review was timely 
filed. The Tax Commission issued its final decision on November 
20, 1991, and the Galleria petitioned the Commission for 
reconsideration on December 10. The Auditing Division filed its 
brief in opposition to reconsideration on January 3, 1992, and 
the Galleria replied on January 21. The Tax Commission issued 
its order denying the petition for reconsideration on March 10, 
1992, and the Galleria filed its petition for judicial review 
within thirty days of that disposition. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989), a 
request for administrative reconsideration is "deemed denied" if 
an order is not issued by the agency within twenty days after the 
filing of the request.6 The Tax Commission did not issue its 
4. (...continued) 
future taxability of those receipts is simply an advisory 
opinion. We disagree. "A case is deemed moot when the requested 
judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." 
Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989). A 
determination by this court will affect the rights of the 
litigants. Furthermore, the issue has been fully briefed and is 
squarely before us. It is clear the real dispute has always been 
whether the tax is applicable to these activities, not simply 
whether the tax is due for any particular period. 
5. In its order denying reconsideration, the Commission 
explicitly recognized that the distinction between taxing batting 
cages and bowling was difficult to draw and that the disparate 
treatment might not exist if a new look at the bowling issue were 
undertaken. In a letter dated August 7, 1986, Jim Roger, then 
Director of the Auditing Division, recognized that ,f[t]he 
Auditing Division has for quite some time had some questions 
about which activities come under the definition of an 
admission." 
6. The "deemed denied" provision states in its entirety: 
If the agency head or the person designated 
for that purpose does not issue an order 
(continued...) 
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order denying reconsideration within twenty days of December 10, 
1991, but rather some three months later, on March 10, 1992. 
Despite its own delay in disposing of the reconsideration 
request, the Tax Commission now argues that, under section 63-
46b-13(3)(b), its order is deemed to have been issued on December 
30, 1991, and the Galleria's petition for review is untimely 
because it was not filed within thirty days of that date, as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989). That 
provision states: 
A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action within 30 days 
after the date that the order constituting 
the final agency action is issued fi£ is 
considered to have been issued under 
Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
Id. (emphasis added). The Tax Commission simply ignores the 
disjunctive term "or" found in section 63-46b-14(3)(a) and 
interprets the statute to mean that if an order is not issued 
within the twenty day "deemed denied" period, the thirty-day 
jurisdictional clock for judicial review begins irretrievably to 
run.7 
We disagree. A plain reading of the statute indicates that 
a party may file a petition for judicial review within thirty 
days after the order constituting the final agency action, in 
this case the order denying reconsideration issued on March 10, 
1992, "0£" within thirty days after the "deemed denied" date 
established by section 63-46b-13(3)(b). In the instant case, the 
Galleria filed its petition for review within thirty days of the 
Tax Commission's March 10 final order and this court therefore 
has jurisdiction to hear the case.8 
6. (...continued) 
within 20 days after the filing of the 
request, the request for reconsideration 
shall be considered to be denied. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(3)(b) (1989). 
7. In the Tax Commission's view, the parties' briefs filed with 
and accepted by the commission in January of 1992 were for 
naught, although accepted by the commission when tendered, 
because they were filed more than twenty days after December 10, 
and the commission's multiple page order of denial, issued weeks 
later, was a completely meaningless gesture. 
8. We note that Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd.. 834 P.2d 568, 
571-72 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), 
(continued...) 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Our analysis of tax cases is guided by the standards of 
review announced in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (Supp. 1993). OSI 
Indus,, Inc. v. State Tax Common. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 34, 34-35 
(Utah App. 1993) (because section 59-1-610 is procedural, it 
applies retroactively). See Miller Welding Supply. Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (Utah App. 1993) (applying 
section 59-1-610 to a sales tax case involving an audit conducted 
between 1987 and 1989). But see Thorup Bros. Constr., Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 221 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah 1993).9 Section 
59-1-610 directs this court to 
grant the commission no deference concerning 
its conclusions of law, applying a correction 
of error standard, unless there is an 
explicit grant of discretion contained in a 
statute at issue before the appellate court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610(1)(b) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added). 
This statute supersedes the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
insofar as it pertains to judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings. Id. § 59-1-610(2). Prior to the recent enactment 
of section 59-1-610, it was the mandate of this court to 
determine whether the Legislature had, either explicitly QT 
8. (...continued) 
relied on by the Tax Commission, does not support its position. 
The Lopez court was concerned with the legal significance of a 
letter issued within the twenty day "deemed denied" period of 
S 63-46b-l3(3)(b) and whether it qualified as an order so as to 
start the thirty-day jurisdictional time then, rather than upon 
the elapse of twenty days. The instant case presents a 
completely different question because the agency's final order 
was issued well beyond the twenty-day period. 
9. In Thorup. decided after both OSI and Miller Welding, the 
Supreme Court reviewed whether the Tax Commission's action was 
contrary to one of the commission's rules under a reasonableness 
and rationality standard, citing the Utah Administrative 
Procedure Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) (1989). It 
is unclear from the decision, since Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-61D was 
not mentioned, whether the new statute was simply not consic^red 
by the Court or whether the Court decided it was inapplicable, 
either by its terms or because the Court does not subscribe -co 
the retroactivity conclusion of OSI and Miller Welding. In ~he 
face of such ambiguity, it is prudent to follow the clear 
holdings of the previous decisions of this court. See State v. 
Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993). 
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implicitly, granted an agency discretion and, if so, to review 
the agency action for reasonableness. Morton Int'l. Inc. v. 
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 587-88 (Utah 1991). See, e.g. . 
SEMECO Indus.. Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1173 
(Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting); Nucor Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm'n. 832 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1992). Section 59-1-610 
requires this court to depart from its prior practice and, in the 
case of the Tax Commission, to refrain from reviewing agency 
action under a deferential standard unless there is an explicit 
grant of discretion. Since the statute at issue, section 59-12-
103, does not contain language which would even arguably 
constitute an explicit grant of discretion to the Tax 
Commission,10 the commission's action in interpreting the scope 
of the sales tax on "admissions" must be reviewed without 
deference and for correctness. 
UTAH'S ADMISSION TAX 
Utah imposes a sales tax on the amount paid or charged by a 
purchaser for 
admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation, including seats 
and tables reserved or otherwise, and other 
similar accommodations[•] 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(f) (1992) (emphasis added). 
The Tax Commission has adopted rules interpreting the key 
language of the admission tax. Utah Administrative Code R865-19-
33S(A) (1993)n specifically states in pertinent part: 
10. The case law indicates that where the Tax Commission has 
been held to have discretion in the interpretation and 
application of the sales tax statute, that delegation is 
implicit. Compare Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n. 842 P.2d 
876, 884-85 (Utah 1992) (decided before the adoption of § 59-1-
610 and finding a grant of discretion without stating whether it 
is explicit or implicit) with SEMECO Indus.. Inc.'v. State Tax 
Comm'n. 849 P.2d 1167, 1175-76 (Utah 1993)(Durham, J., 
dissenting)(finding implicit delegation to interpret terms within 
Utah's sales tax statute). See also Morton Int'l. Inc. v. State 
Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). 
11. We cite to the most recent version of the Utah Administrative 
Code as a convenience to the reader. The portions of the rules 
quoted in this opinion were the same, in all material respects, 
throughout the audit period. 
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A. "Admission" means the right or 
privilege to enter into a place. Admission 
includes the amount paid for the right to use 
a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, 
theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, 
meeting house, or gymnasium to view any type 
of entertainment. Admission also includes 
the right to use a table at a night club, 
hotel, or roof garden whether such charge is 
designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, 
or any such similar charge. 
Aside from its elaboration on seats and tables, not applicable 
here, this rule speaks in terms of the right to enter a place and 
not in terms of a fee charged to use facilities or equipment 
within a place. As such, the rule merely incorporates the plain 
and settled meaning of "admission." See, e.g.. Webster/s Third 
New International Dictionary 28 (1976) (defining admission as, 
inter alia, "an act of admitting . . .; permission or right to 
enter"). 
Neither the existence nor the content of the interpretive 
rule defining "admission" is meaningfully challenged in the 
instant proceeding. The single issue for us, then, is this: 
Assuming the rule reflects the correct interpretation of the 
statute, as seems inarguable, did the Tax Commission decide 
correctly that sales tax on admissions should be assessed on the 
fees charged by the Galleria for the use of batting cages, the 
roller rink, and laser tag? While the Tax Commission "recognizes 
that distinctions between [bowling and batting cages] are 
difficult to draw,"12 we hold no meaningful distinction can be 
drawn for purposes of the admissions tax, given the Tax 
Commission's own interpretation of "admission." 
Not only does the record indicate no fee is charged for the 
right or privilege to enter the Galleria, but individuals such as 
coaches may enter the batting cage without paying an admission 
fee. The situation is apparently no different for laser tag or 
roller skating. Consequently, the Tax Commission erred in 
departing from its traditional application of the rule. The rule 
12. The Tax Commission, as admitted in the order denying the 
petition for reconsideration in this case, has consistently taken 
the position that bowling is not subject to the sales tax on 
admission fees. Nor have fees for golfing, tennis, racguetball, 
miniature golf, or driving ranges been subject to the tax* The 
Tax Commission's application of its rule vis-a-vis bowling and 
these other activities appears to be correct because no admission 
fee is customarily charged for the "right or privilege to enter," 
for instance, a bowling alley. 
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states that admission means the "right to enter a place.1' There 
is simply no fee charged by the Galleria for admission to any 
place; there are only fees charged to do particular things.13 
Thus, given the Tax Commission's own interpretation of the 
statute, as memorialized in its rule, its decision in this case 
is incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission's decision that the Galleria is liable 
for an admission tax on the activities of roller skating, batting 
cages, and laser tag is therefore reversed. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Ls 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
&g4*ft?f. 
Norman H. Jackson, €Tudge 
13. Language in another rule, which rule is vigorously 
challenged by the Galleria, defines "place of amusement.11 That 
rule has verbiage consistent with the Tax Commission's position. 
See Utah Admin. Code R865-19-34S (1993) ("sale of"a ticket for a 
ride upon a mechanical or self-operated device is an admission to 
a place of amusement"). However, given the scheme of § 59-12-
103(l)(f), the meaning of the terms "place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation" becomes relevant only if the 
threshold determination of an "admission" had been shown. Thus, 
because we hold the fees charged by the Galleria for use of the 
batting cages, etc., are not for admission, we need not go on to 
decide whether those venues qualify as "place[s] of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation." 
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today and make that a part of the record 
and I will consider the timeliness and 
determine from that whether I can con-
sider the merits 
The administrative law judge did not mis-
lead Armstrong such that her right to a 
fair hearing was jeopardized. 
[5] Armstrong also argues her due 
process rights were compromised by the 
short duration of the appeals period. We 
disagree. The Utah Supreme Court previ-
ously rejected this argument in addressing 
the short statutory appeals period for those 
appealing judgments from small claims 
courts. Before a 1988 amendment in-
creased the appeals period to ten days, an 
appellant had only five days in which to 
appeal a small claims court judgment. 
Nevertheless, the supreme court found this 
time period did not deprive appellants of 
their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Lar-
son Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 P.2d 
233, 233 (Utah) (small claims court appel-
lant having five days to appeal is not de-
nied equal protection and is "given a rea-
sonable time within which to take an ap-
peal"), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 909, 97 
S.Ct. 299, 50 L.Ed.2d 277 (1976); accord 
Hume v. Small Claims Court, 590 P.2d 
309, 311 (Utah 1979); see also Kapetanov 
v. Small Claims Court, 659 P.2d 1049, 
1052 (Utah 1983) (small claims courts' five-
day appeals period does not offend due 
process and fact that other civil appellants 
have a thirty-day appeals period "is of no 
consequence"). 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the Board did not err in 
declining to address the merits of Arm-
strong's untimely appeal. Armstrong 
failed to demonstrate good cause for filing 
her appeal late, the deadline for filing an 
appeal is not ambiguous, and Armstrong's 
constitutional rights were not jeopardized. 
Therefore, we affirm. 
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
George A. LOPEZ, Petitioner, 
v. 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
and Industrial Commission of 
Utah, Respondents. 
No. 910501-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
May 27, 1992. 
State employee sought review of juris-
dictional hearing conducted by Career Ser-
vice Review Board wherein Board deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction to 
hear his employment grievance. The Court 
of Appeals, Bench, P.J., held that: (1) pro-
ceeding was a formal adjudicative one that 
it could properly review; (2) letter from 
hearing officer was not "written order" 
and employee's petition for judicial review, 
filed within 30 days of date his request for 
reconsideration of hearing officer's decision 
was deemed denied, was timely; (3) hear-
ing officer's refusal to consider employee's 
written proffer of facts did not violate due 
process; and (4) Board lacked jurisdiction, 
insofar as employee was not subjected to 
"de facto suspension" when he opted to 
take unpaid leave of absence in order to 
attend law school, and employing agency 
did not violate personnel rule by deciding 
not to allow him to job share. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
®=>796 
Questions regarding whether adminis-
trative agency has afforded petitioner due 
process in its hearings are questions of 
law, and court therefore does not give def-
erence to agency's actions. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmends. 5, 14. 
2. Appeal and Error <S=>842(1) 
Jurisdictional determinations are ques-
tions of law to which Court of Appeals 
gives no deference. 
LOPEZ v. CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BD. Utan ^y 
Cite as 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992) 
Law and Procedure 6. Officers and Public Employees <^72.61 
State employee had burden of showing 
that his grievance fit into statutorily desig-
nated category in order to bring that griev-
ance before Career Service Review Board. 
U.C A.1953, 67-19a-202(l). 
3. Administrative 
<s=*701 
Officers and Public Employees <S=>72.41 
Administrative appeal by state employ-
ee seeking review of jurisdictional hearing 
conducted by Career Service Review Board, 
wherein Board determined that it did not 
have jurisdiction to hear employee's griev-
ance, was formal adjudicative proceeding 
that Court of Appeals could properly re-
view; hearing was conducted and there 
was no showing that any of the statutory 
requirements of formal hearing set forth in 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act had not 
been met U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-8, 63-46b-
16. 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>723 
Officers and Public Employees @=*72.47 
Hearing officer's letter sent nine days 
after state employee requested that officer 
reconsider her decision, stating that officer 
had read employee's motion and that it had 
not persuaded her to change her decision, 
was not"written order" within meaning of 
Utah Administrative Procedure Act, inso-
far as it was not sufficiently detailed; thus, 
employee's request for reconsideration was 
deemed denied as matter of law 20 days 
after it was filed, and his petition for judi-
cial review, filed within 30 days of deemed 
denial, was timely. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-
10(1), 63-46b-13(3)(a, b), 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>469 
Constitutional Law <S=>278.4(5) 
Officers and Public Employees <3=»72.16 
Even if hearing officer improperly re-
fused to consider state employee's written 
proffer of facts, that refusal did not violate 
due process, absent showing that hearing 
officer's actions were patently unfair; em-
ployee was allowed to testify at length in 
lieu of written statement, which did not 
contain a single fact that employee was not 
allowed to present orally. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amends. 5, 14. 
7, Officers and Public Employees <e=>72.22 
For purposes of determining whether 
Career Service Review Board had jurisdic-
tion of its grievance, senior investigator 
with Utah State Industrial Commission was 
not given "de facto suspension" when Com-
mission required him to take unpaid leave 
of absence in order to attend law school; 
employee made conscious decision to attend 
law school after being formally notified 
that he would be required to take a leave of 
absence if he did so. U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-
202(1). 
8, Officers and Public Employees e=*72.22 
For purposes of determining whether 
Career Service Review Board had jurisdic-
tion to hear state employee's grievance, 
Utah State Industrial Commission's deci-
sion not to allow senior investigator to job 
share did not violate personnel rule, insofar 
as rule gave Commission full discretion as 
to whether job sharing would be allowed. 
U.C.A.1953, 67-19a-202(l). 
Lynn J. Lund, Salt Lake City, for peti-
tioner. 
Benjamin A. Sims and Thomas C. Sturdy, 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Before BENCH, 
RUSSON, JJ. 
P.J., and ORME and 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Petitioner Lopez seeks review of a juris-
dictional hearing conducted by respondent 
Career Service Review Board (the Board), 
wherein the Board determined that it did 
not have jurisdiction to hear Lopez's em-
ployment grievance. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Lopez is a senior investigator with the 
Utah State Industrial Commission (the 
Commission). He claims that in 1989 he 
„ _ — _ ^ „ 
wards using investigators with legal train-
ing.1 Since Lopez had no legal training, he 
decided that it would be to his professional 
advantage to attend law school. He ap-
plied for and was accepted to the Universi-
ty of Utah law school. Upon learning of 
his acceptance, Lopez requested that he be 
allowed to work part-time while attending 
law school. His immediate supervisor in-
formed him in writing that his proposal to 
work part-time was rejected. Lopez never-
theless pursued additional discussions in an 
attempt to accommodate the interests of 
the Commission. Various alternatives 
were discussed, but none was accepted. 
Lopez claims that at one point in the 
discussions his supervisor asked him to 
draft a contract reflecting his proposal to 
work part-time on a job share basis. Lopez 
assumed that the request indicated that his 
job share proposal had been accepted. The 
contract he prepared, however, was never 
expressly accepted or rejected by the Com-
mission. 
Lopez went to law school. Part of his 
proposed plan was that he would use his 
annual leave while adjusting to law-school 
life. He therefore took approximately one 
month of annual leave at the beginning of 
the school year. When he attempted to 
return to work part-time, however, he was 
informed that his proposal to job share was 
still unacceptable. The Commission of-
fered him the opportunity to work at a 
temporary level for 19 hours a week, but, 
because it was a temporary position, he 
would be required to relinquish his career 
service status. In the alternative, the Com-
mission was willing to grant him a leave of 
absence without pay, thereby keeping his 
status intact. The only other alternative 
was for him sitnply to resign his position. 
Lopez opted to take the leave of absence 
1. The Commission denies any trend, but it does 
admit that in advertisements for investigators it 
had indicated that preference would be given to 
those with legal training. 
2. The Commission asserts that UAPA does not 
govern this case because UAPA does not apply 
to "internal personnel actions within an agency 
concerning its own employees, or judicial re-
view of those actions." Section 63-46b-l(2)(e). 
The Board errs in asserting that the Board's 
emu, unuc i yiuwcot, o igucu a n d g i e e u i e m to 
that effect. Following his first year of law 
school, Lopez returned to full-time work 
with the Commission in his former position. 
Lopez filed a grievance that progressed 
unsuccessfully through the Commission's 
internal review process. Lopez then re-
quested an evidentiary hearing before the 
Board. Inasmuch as there was some ques-
tion whether the Board was authorized to 
hear the grievance, the administrator of 
the Board ordered that a jurisdictional 
hearing be conducted. The administrator 
then recused himself due to a conflict 
caused by his involvement with an advisory 
board of the Commission, and a hearing 
officer was appointed to conduct the hear-
ing. 
At the hearing, Lopez "proffered" his 
version of the facts in writing. The hear-
ing officer refused to accept his written 
version due to its length and argumenta-
tive nature. The Commission proposed its 
own "chronology" of events and doc-
uments, which was admitted without objec-
tion from Lopez. Lopez was then allowed 
to testify as to any facts he felt were 
relevant. His counsel questioned him for 
approximately three hours. The hearing 
officer then ruled that the grievance did 
not come within any of the statutory cate-
gories over which the Board had jurisdic-
tion. The hearing officer further held that 
Lopez was not harmed by the Commission's 
actions because he was allowed to return to 
his former position after the leave of ab-
sence. 
In accordance with section 13 of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), 
Lopez requested that the hearing officer 
reconsider her decision.2 The decision was 
not altered, and Lopez filed this petition for 
actions constitute "internal personnel actions 
within an agency." The Board is an agency 
external to the Commission to which personnel 
matters are appealed. UAPA therefore applies. 
This conclusion is supported by statutory lan-
guage within the chapter establishing the Board 
that indicates UAPA applies to actions by the 
Board. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19a-
202(2), 67-19a-203(6) (1986). 
Cite as 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992) 
review. He alleges three principal errors 
bv the hearing officer: (1) the refusal to 
accept his written proffer of facts was a 
denial of due process, (2) the conclusion 
that the Board did not have jurisdiction to 
hear his grievance was erroneous, and (3) 
the finding that he was not harmed by the 
Commission's actions was clearly errone-
ous 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1,2] Questions regarding whether an 
administrative agency has afforded a peti-
tioner due process in its hearings are ques-
tions of law. We therefore do not give 
deference to the agency's actions. Tolman 
v Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 
23, 28 (Utah App. 1991). Jurisdictional de-
terminations are questions of law to which 
we give no deference. Department of So-
cial Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 
(Utah 1989). 
OUR JURISDICTION 
Before addressing the merits of the peti-
tion, we consider two threshold questions 
as to whether this court has jurisdiction. 
Formal or Informal Proceedings 
[3] The first jurisdictional question in-
volves whether this administrative appeal 
should be before the district court. UAPA 
provides that district courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over administrative appeals 
from informal adjudicative proceedings. 
Section 63-46b-15. Administrative appeals 
from formal adjudicative proceedings are 
to be made either to this court or to the 
supreme court. Section 63-46b-l6. 
Administrative appeals that are improp-
erly brought to this court are to be trans-
ferred to the district court pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 44. 
Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah 
App.1990). In Alumbaugh, the administra-
tor of the Career Services Review Board 
conducted an administrative review of an 
employee's grievance file without a hear-
ing. We held that the absence of a hearing 
ttade the Board's action informal, despite 
the Board's designation of all adjudicative 
proceedings as formal, and transferred the 
case to district court for a trial de novo. 
Id. 
In the present case, the hearing officer 
conducted a hearing. Lopez was allowed 
to appear before the hearing officer and to 
present his position. Evidence and doc-
uments were accepted into the record, and 
a court reporter was present. There has 
been no showing that any of the require-
ments of a formal hearing, as set forth in 
section 8 of UAPA, have not been met. 
Since there was a hearing! and there is no 
showing of any violations of section 8, we 
conclude that this was a formal adjudica-
tive proceeding that we may properly re-
view. 
Timeliness 
[4] The second jurisdictional question 
involves the timeliness of Lopez's petition 
to this court. The hearing officer entered 
her decision on July 2, 1991. Lopez re-
quested on July 22nd that the hearing offi-
cer reconsider her decision. On July 31st, 
the hearing officer sent Lopez a letter. 
The full text of the letter was as follows: 
"I have read your Motion for Reconsidera-
tion and Evidentiary Hearing. This let-
ter is to notify you that your motion has 
not persuaded me to change my decision." 
Lopez filed this petition for review on Sep-
tember 3rd. 
Subsection 14(3)(a) of UAPA provides: 
"A party shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action within 30 
days after the date that the order constitut-
ing the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to be issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b)." Subsection 13(3) applies 
to requests that an agency reconsider its 
action and provides: 
(a) The agency head, or a person desig-
nated for that purpose, shall issue a writ-
ten order granting the request or deny-
ing the request. 
(b) If the agency head or the person 
designated for that purpose does not is-
sue an order within 20 days after the 
filing of the request, the request for 
reconsideration shall be considered to be 
denied. 
hearing officer constitutes a "written or-
der." If it does, then Lopez's appeal is 
untimely, the thirty days having run their 
course on August 30th, four days before 
Lopez filed his petition. If the letter did 
not constitute a written order, then Lopez's 
request for reconsideration was deemed de-
nied, as a matter of law, on August 11th, 
twenty days from his request. Lopez's 
filing on September 3rd would therefore be 
timely. 
Section 10 of UAPA requires considera-
ble detail in agency orders issued in connec-
tion with formal adjudicative proceedings. 
It states, in pertinent part: 
(1) Within a reasonable time after the 
hearing, or after the filing of any post-
hearing papers permitted by the presid-
ing officer, or within the time required 
by any applicable statute or rule of the 
agency, the presiding officer shall sign 
and issue an order that includes: 
(a) a statement of the presiding offi-
cer's findings of fact . . . ; 
(b) a statement of the presiding offi-
cer's conclusions of law; 
(c) a statement of the reasons for 
the presiding officer's decision; 
(d) a statement of any relief ordered 
by the agency; 
(e) a notice of the right to apply for 
reconsideration; 
(f) a notice of any right to adminis-
' trative or judicial review of the order 
available to aggrieved parties; and 
(g) the time limits applicable to any 
reconsideration or review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-10 (1989). 
An ambiguous letter, merely indicating 
that the request, for reconsideration was 
unpersuasive, does not constitute a ''writ-
ten order" as described in subsection 10(1). 
As a matter of appellate necessity, we 
must have unambiguous final administra-
tive orders from which we may calculate 
jurisdictional time periods. Otherwise, our 
jurisdiction can become uncertain. 
Inasmuch as the hearing officer's letter 
was insufficient to constitute a written or-
der as anticipated by subsection 13(3)(a), 
Lopez's request for reconsideration is 
section 13(3)(b). His petition for review is 
therefore timely. 
THE MERITS 
Proffer of Facts 
[5] Lopez first asserts that the hearing 
officer denied him due process by not con-
sidering his written proffer of facts. He 
relies upon Tolman for the proposition that 
"due process demands a new trial when the 
appearance of unfairness is so plain that 
[the appellate court is] left with the abiding 
impression that a reasonable person would 
find the hearing unfair." Tolman, 818 
P.2d at 28 (quoting Bunnell v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 n. 1 (Utah 
1987)). Even if it were improper for the 
hearing officer to refuse to consider Lo-
pez's written version of the facts, as assert-
ed by Lopez, he has nevertheless failed to 
present to this court any explanation of 
how the actions of the hearing officer were 
patently unfair. At the hearing, Lopez 
was allowed to testify at length in lieu of 
the written statement. He has not directed 
us to a single fact contained in the written 
statement that he was not allowed to 
present orally to the hearing officer. Giv-
en Lopez's opportunity to testify, we sim-
ply are not left with an abiding impression 
that a reasonable person would find the 
hearing unfair. 
Jurisdiction of Board 
The Board was established to provide 
state civil service employees with a forum 
for appealing personnel decisions outside 
the agency for which they work. The 
Board, however, does not have jurisdiction 
to hear all appeals of all personnel matters. 
Its jurisdiction is statutorily limited to cer-
tain agency actions. 
(a) The board shall serve as the final 
administrative body to review appeals 
from career service employees arid agen-
cies of decisions about promotions, dis-
missals, demotions, suspensions, written 
reprimands, wages, salary, violations of 
personnel rules, issues concerning the eq-
uitable administration of benefits, reduc-
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tions in force, and disputes concerning 
abandonment of position that have not 
been resolved at an earlier stage in the 
grievance procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to 
review or decide any other personnel 
matters. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l) (Supp. 
1991) (emphasis added).3 
When an employee files a grievance with 
the Board, subsection 403(2)(a) requires the 
Board's administrator to determine the fol-
lowing factors before the Board may hear 
the grievance. 
(i) whether or not the employee is a 
career service employee and is entitled to 
use the grievance system, 
(ii) whether or not the board has juris-
diction over the grievance, 
(iii) whether or not the employee has 
been directly harmed; and 
(iv) the issues to be heard. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-403(2)(a) (Supp. 
1991). 
In order to make the determinations re-
quired, the administrator may "hold a juris-
dictional hearing, where the parties may 
present oral arguments, written argu-
ments, or both." Subsection 67-19a-
403(2)(b)(i). This was the basis and goal of 
the jurisdictional hearing from which Lopez 
now appeals.4 
[6] Lopez initially challenges the hear-
ing officer's determination that the Board 
lacked jurisdiction by asserting that the 
Board's administrator erroneously placed 
the "burden of proof" on Lopez to prove 
that the Board had jurisdiction. It is axio-
matic that a party wishing to bring a mat-
ter before a tribunal with limited subject 
matter jurisdiction must present sufficient 
facts to invoke the limited jurisdiction of 
that tribunal. Department of Social 
3. Ail other matters may be grieved only to the 
level of the department head whose decision is 
final and unappealable to the Board. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 67-19a-302(2) (Supp. 1991). 
4. Lopez asserts that the hearing officer improp-
erly treated the jurisdictional hearing as a hear-
ing on the merits. There is some language in 
the hearing officer's decision that supports his 
claim. As indicated in subsection 403(2)(b), the 
jurisdictional hearing is to consider the four 
Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 
1989). It was therefore necessary for Lo-
pez to show that his grievance fit into one 
of the categories of grievances designated 
in subsection 202(1) in order to bring his 
grievance before the Board. 
[7] Lopez argues the Board has juris-
diction because the Commission's require-
ment that he take a leave of absence with-
out pay was a "de facto suspension." The 
hearing officer, however, found that Lopez 
made a conscious decision to attend law 
school and that hits decision was made after 
he had been formally notified that he would 
be required to take a leave of absence if he 
were to attend law school. The hearing 
officer also found that the ongoing discus-
sions between Lopez and the Commission 
concerning other possible work alternatives 
had not resulted in a meeting of the minds. 
Given the hearing officer's factual find-
ings, it is clear that the unpaid leave of 
absence was the direct result of Lopez's 
unilateral and voluntary decision to attend 
law school. It was not in any way initiated 
by the Commission. The record is clear 
that Lopez was always free to remain in 
his job full time as long as he did not elect 
to attend law school He may not now 
transform the direct result of his own vol-
untary decision into a "de facto suspen-
sion" by the Commission. 
[8] Lopez also argues that the Commis-
sion violated several personnel rules when 
it refused to allow him to work during law 
school. As stated in subsection 202(1), 
grievances arising from violations of per-
sonnel rules are within the Board's jurisdic-
tion. Lopez points to Human Resource 
Management Rule R468-5-12, which states 
with our emphasis: 
factors set out in subsection 403(2)(a). If an 
employee's grievance meets the statutory re-
quirements in subsection 403(2)(a), the employ-
ee is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the 
claim. Any language suggesting that the hear-
ing officer considered the actual merits of Lo-
pez's grievance was nevertheless harmless since 
the factual findings clearly show that jurisdic-
tion was lacking as a matter of law. 
U l *± w * * -TlLVylJI l \ j 1 V U 1 V / 1 V 1 J U U , * U O L i l V l L i O 
Agency management may establish a 
program of job sharing as a means of 
increasing opportunities for career part-
time employment In the absence of an 
agency program, individual employees 
may request approval for job sharing 
status through agency management. 
Utah Admin.Code § R468-&-12 (1991). 
The hearing officer held that the Com-
mission's decision not to allow Lopez to job 
share was not a violation of this policy 
because the rule gives the Commission full 
discretion whether to allow job sharing. 
The hearing officer reasoned that since 
there was no mandate that job sharing be 
allowed, job sharing was a privilege that 
might be granted by the Commission, but it 
was not a right to which Lopez was entitled 
by law. Since the Commission's decision 
not to allow job sharing was within its 
discretion, Lopez's complaint could not logi-
cally constitute a claim that a personnel 
rule had been "violated." We agree. 
Discretionary personnel powers granted 
to agencies do not constitute mandates. 
Absent a statutory mandate that an em-
ployee receive a certain benefit, the em-
ployee may not demand it as a right. Since 
there was no mandate requiring the Com-
mission to allow Lopez to job share, Lopez 
has failed to identify any personnel rule 
that was violated by the Commission's re-
fusal to allow him to job share. Jurisdic-
tion therefore was properly denied.5 
Harm to Lopez 
Finally, Lopez claims that the hearing 
officer erred when she found that he had 
not been harmed by being "required" to 
take an unpaid leave of absence because he 
was able to return to his former position. 
Whether Lopez was directly harmed by the 
Commission's action is the third factor to 
be determined at a jurisdictional hearing. 
See section 67-19a-403(2)(a)(iii). However, 
the hearing officer did not need to reach 
this issue because she determined that Lo-
pez's grievance did not fall within the cate-
5. Lopez also points to the Human Resource 
Management Rules regarding "Time Limited Po 
sitions," Utah Admin.Code § R468-5-10 (1991), 
and "Education Assistance," Utah Admin.Code 
§ R468-10-^(1991). We limit our discussion to 
gory of grievances over which the Board 
had jurisdiction. Regardless of whether or 
not Lopez was harmed, the Board could not 
hear the grievance. We therefore need not 
address this final claim of error. 
CONCLUSION 
The hearing officer's finding that the 
Board lacked jurisdiction to hear Lopez's 
grievance is affirmed. 
ORME and RUSSON, JJ., concur 
Jasbir S. BHATIA, Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY; and Pizza Hut of 
Utah, Respondents. 
No. 910498-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 2, 1992. 
Cook sought judicial review of final 
decision of Board of Review of Industrial 
Commission denying his application for un-
employment compensation benefits. The 
Court of Appeals, Billings, Associate P.J., 
held that cook who stormed out of restau-
rant during middle of busy shift after ut-
tering vulgarity to manager was dis-
charged for "just cause" and not entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits. 
Affirmed. 
Bench, P.J., concurred and filed opin-
ion. 
the policy on job sharing since our analysis 
applies equally to all three policies Under 
these rules, agencies are given the ability to 
create time limited positions and provide edu-
cation assistance in their discretion. 
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amination of plaintiff's witness Dr. Dall as 
well as through introduction of hospital rec-
ords which noted administration of the lung 
scan tests. 
Q. Did you have some purpose in 
mind why you didn't want a venogram to 
your right leg? A. Definitely, general 
pain and nothing wrong with the right 
leg 
Q Was there any other reason? A. 
Medically I didn't—medically I didn't 
think it was necessary. 
Since Mercer testified there was nothing 
wrong with her right leg which would re-
quire testing, the subject was opened for 
refutation. Defendants were entitled to in-
troduce evidence of usual medical practice 
to show medical necessity of a right leg 
venogram to diagnose possible, visually un-
detectable blood clots of the right leg. 
Mercer additionally contends evidence of 
hospital consent procedures is not relevant 
to her consent to a right leg venogram. 
Consent, however, is a factual issue in the 
present case. Existing hospital consent 
procedures, especially those followed in be-
half of Mercer by her husband, seem rele-
vant to a factual determination concerning 
the consent in issue. 
[6] II. Similar test procedures. Short-
ly after her admission to the hospital Mer-
cer underwent lung scan tests which, testi-
mony showed, were similar in many re-
spects to venograms. Appellant Mercer 
contends in this appeal that such consent to 
lung scan tests is not relevant to the issue 
of consent to a bilateral venogram. We 
need not review the exercise of trial court's 
discretion on this issue, however, since the 
challenged evidence is admissible on an al-
ternative ground. 
We have said a party cannot complain on 
appeal of evidence which the party, himself, 
introduced into the record. See Brown v. 
First National Bank of Mason City, 193 
N.W.2d 547, 555 (Iowa 1972) (challenged 
evidence of gossip and rumor concerning 
bank investigation elicited by appellant as 
defendant at trial) and Times-Guthrian 
Publishing Co. v. Guthrie County Vedette, 
256 Iowa 302, 304, 125 N.W.2d 829, 831 
(1964) (challenged subscription card brought 
out by appellant as plaintiff at trial). The 
record reveals that Mercer introduced evi-
dence of the lung scans'" through direct ex-
[7] III. Failure to resist testing. In 
her direct testimony early in the trial Mer-
cer testified she physically resisted adminis-
tration of the right leg venogram. In this 
appeal, however, appellant Mercer contends 
evidence of lack of physical resistance was 
not relevant to consent and that defendants 
thereby introduced an erroneous element of 
necessity of resistance into, consent law. 
Since plaintiff Mercer, herself, testified 
to her physical resistance to the right leg 
venogram, defendants were entitled to 
present evidence in rebuttal under the au-
thorities discussed in division I above. We 
cannot say trial court erred in permitting 
the defense to contradict plaintiffs direct 
testimony. 
We have considered all contentions raised 
by plaintiff and find them to be without 
merit 
AFFIRMED. 
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FORD MOTOR COMPANY, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
IOWA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPOR-
TATION REGULATIONS BOARD, 
Respondent-Appellee, 
Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc., 
Intervenor-Appeilee. 
No, 62630. 
Supreme Court of Iowa. 
Aug. 29, 1979. 
Automobile manufacturer petitioned 
for judicial review of denial by the Trans-
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portation Regulations Board of application 
seeking to enter into a franchise agreement 
for a new automobile dealership. The Polk 
District Court, A. B. Crouch, J., sustained 
motion to dismiss, and appeal was taken. 
The Supreme Court, Harris, J., held that: 
(1) where application for rehearing of ad-
ministrative decision was filed March 22, 
1978, it was deemed denied 20 days later, on 
April 11, 1978, when it had not been ruled 
on by the agency, and thus 30-day period 
for applying for judicial review ended May 
11, 1978, even though the agency filed a 
written denial of the application for rehear-
ing on April 14, 1978, and (2) failure to 
timely file application for judicial review 
was a jurisdictional defect 
Affirmed. 
L Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=»722 
Where application for rehearing of ad-
ministrative decision was filed March 22, 
1978, it was deemed denied 20 days later, on 
April 11, 1978, when it had not been ruled 
on by the agency, and thus 30-day period 
for applying for judicial review ended May 
11, 1978, even though the agency filed a 
written denial of the application for rehear-
ing on April 14, 1978. I.C.A. §§ 17A.16, 
subd. 2, 17A.19, 17A.19, subd. 3. 
2. Automobiles <s=>84 
Failure to timely file application for 
judicial review of ruling of the Transporta-
tion Regulations Board denying application 
to enter into an automobile franchise agree-
ment was a jurisdictional defect. I.C.A. 
§§ 17A.16, subd. 2, 17A.19, 17A.19, subd. 3. 
Robert F. Holz, Jr. and Edwin N. Mcin-
tosh, Des Moines, for appellant. 
T. Scott Bannister and Martha Martell, 
Des Moines, for respondent-appellee. 
Joseph E. Day of Hines, Pence, Day & 
Powers, Cedar Rapids, and W. Don Brittin, 
Jr., of Nyemaster, Goode, McLaughlin, Em-
ery & O'Brien, Des Moines, for intervenor-
appellee. 
Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and 
UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK, 
and LARSON, JJ. 
HARRIS, Justice. 
This appeal turns on whether a petition 
for judicial review of an administrative ac-
tion was timely. The trial court held the 
petition was not timely and that the tardi-
ness was fatal to its jurisdiction. We agree. 
Ford Motor Company filed an application 
with the transportation regulation board of 
the Iowa department of transportation, 
pursuant to section 322A.6, The Code 1975, 
seeking to enter into a franchise agreement 
for a new Ford dealership in Cedar Rapids. 
The application was resisted by various in-
tervening Ford dealers located in the area, 
including Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. Fol-
lowing a hearing the department denied 
Ford's application. 
Ford filed an application for rehearing, 
pursuant to section 17A.16(2), The Code 
1977 (Iowa Administrative Procedure Act). 
The department denied Ford's motion for 
rehearing. Ford thereafter petitioned for 
judicial review of the department's decision, 
pursuant to section 17A.19, The Code 1977. 
Bob Zimmerman Ford moved to dismiss the 
petition as untimely. This appeal is from a 
trial court ruling sustaining Zimmerman's 
motion to dismiss 
[1] I. The question calls for interpreta-
tion of the following provisions from the 
administrative procedure act: 
Any party may file an application for 
rehearing, stating the specific grounds 
therefor and the relief sought, within 
twenty days after the issuance of any 
final decision by the agency in a contest-
ed case. A copy of such application ahaU 
be timely mailed by the applicant to all 
parties of record not joining therein. 
Such an application for rehearing shall be 
deemed to have been denied unless the 
agency grants the application within 
twenty days after its filing. 
§ 17A.16(2) (emphasis added). 
If a party files an application under 
section 17A.1G, subsection 2, for rehearing 
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with the agency, the petition for judicial 
review must be filed within thirty days 
after that application has been denied or 
deemed denied. 
§ 17A.19(3) (emphasis added). 
Ford's difficulty stems from the fact that 
its application for rehearing was "deemed 
denied" under section 17A.16(2) before the 
agency's written denial was filed. But 
Ford ignored the "deemed denied" provision 
of the statute and paced its subsequent 
filing timetable from the date the written 
denial was filed. The dates were as fol-
lows: Ford's application for rehearing (un-
der section 17A.16(2)) was filed March 22, 
1978. By operation of the statute this ap-
plication was deemed denied April 11, 1978, 
when it had not been ruled upon by the 
agency. Nevertheless, the agency filed a 
written denial of the application April 14, 
1978. Under section 17A.19(3) Ford had 30 
days in which to petition for judicial review. 
The statute states that the 30-day period 
begins to run when the application before 
the agency "has been denied or deemed 
denied." 
Because the application before the agen-
cy was deemed denied April 11, the applica-
tion for judicial review was due May 11, 
1978. The trial court dismissed the pro-
ceeding because it was not filed until May 
12, 1978. 
[2] II. In Kerr v. Iowa Public Service 
Co., 274 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Iowa 1979), we 
pointed out: 
Judicial review of the administrative pro-
ceedings is a right conferred by statute. 
[Authorities.] 
We have said that where a right of 
judicial review is statutory, the procedure 
prescribed, by the statute must be fol-
lowed. [Authority.] . . . [F]ailure 
to satisfy requirements of § 17A.19 [is] a 
jurisdictional defect . . . . 
See Richards v. Iowa State Commerce Com-
mission, 270 N.W.2d 616, 619 (Iowa 1978); 
Iowa Public Service Company v. Iowa State 
Commerce Commission, 263 N.W.2d 766, 770 
(Iowa 1978). 
administrative 
various reasons, meet 
Ford argues that some 
agencies might, for 
irregularly. Under the trial court's inter-
pretation of section 17A.19(3)—which we 
adopt—inability to meet within the statuto-
ry period would rob the agency of its juris-
diction to act on an application to review its 
own decision. Ford assails this interpreta-
tion as at once harsh and absurd. 
We conceded that the operation of the 
statute might seem harsh, especially where, 
as here, a party might have been misled by 
the nullity of a later filing.' Nevertheless, 
we believe that the statutory scheme is 
neither absurd nor unfair. Parties to the 
proceedings have a need for and a right to a 
prompt disposition of a dispute. We are 
confident that the legislature was fully 
aware that administrative agencies might 
meet irregularly. Hence, in the interests of 
a prompt disposition of disputes, the legisla-
ture superimposed an automatic denial of 
any application not ruled upon within the 
prescribed period. 
Regrettable hardships may well result to 
litigants who are unaware of the "deemed 
denied" provision of the statute. But it is 
in the over-all interests of litigants and the 
public at large that administrative proceed-
ings move to a prompt conclusion. The 
legislature obviously had the broader public 
interest in mind in adopting the statute. 
The trial court was right in determining 
that Ford's petition for judicial review was 
untimely. 
AFFIRMED. 
(O I KEYNUM8£RSYSTElC 
PAGE 1 
ttion Rank(R) Database Mode 
So.2d 538 R 11 OF 20 ALLSTATES Page 
licare&Medicaid Guide P 37,164 
:e as: 519 So.2d 538) 
Flora L. DAVIS 
v. 
ALABAMA MEDICAID AGENCY, and Michael Horsley, as Commissioner. 
Civ. 6114. 
Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama. 
Dec. 9, 1987. 
.ate medicaid agency determined applicant was disqualified from receiving 
licaid benefits for period of three months and notified applicant of 
,ermination on January 16. Applicant filed rehearing application on January 
was advised of denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial review 
ild be had pursuant to statute by letter dated March 10, and forwarded notice 
appeal by letter dated April 9. The Circuit Court, Montgomery County, 
liam R. Gordon, J., found the applicant's notice of appeal was untimely and 
missed appeal. Applicant appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals, Ingram, J., 
d that appeal was untimely, as application for rehearing was deemed denied 
expiration of 30 days and applicant was required to file notice of appeal 
hin 30 days after decision on application for rehearing, 
firmed. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE k722.1 
Jc722.1 
merly 15Ak722 
icaid benefit applicant's April 9th appeal from determination that applicant 
disqualified from receiving medicaid benefits for period of three months, 
which applicant was notified on January 16, was untimely; although 
licant filed application for rehearing on January 27 and was advised by 
ter dated March 10 of denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial 
iew could be had under statute, her application for rehearing was deemed 
ied by operation of law at expiration of 30 days, on February 26, and 
licant was statutorily required to file notice of appeal within 30 days 
er decision on application for rehearing, so notice of appeal should have 
n filed within 30 days of date application for rehearing was deemed denied, 
ruary 26. Code 1975, ss 41-22-17(a, e), 41-22-20(a, d). 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE k241.115 
fck241.115 
icaid benefit applicant's April 9th appeal from determination that applicant 
disqualified from receiving medicaid benefits for period of three months, 
tfhich applicant was notified on January 16, was untimely; although 
Licant filed application for rehearing on January 27 and was advised by 
ter dated March 10 of denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial 
Lew could be had under statute, her application for rehearing was deemed 
Led by operation of law at expiration of 30 days, on February 26, and 
Licant was statutorily required to file notice of appeal within 30 days 
*r decision on application for rehearing, so notice of appeal should have 
l filed within 30 days of date application for rehearing was deemed denied, 
22 
February 26- Code 1975, ss 41-22-17(a, e), 41-22-20(a, d). 
COPR. (C) WEST 1993 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS 
ol9 So.2d 538 PAGE 
Cite as: 519 So.2d 538) 
[2] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE k722.1 
15Ak722.1 
Formerly 15Ak722 
Letter advising medicaid benefit applicant of denial of her application for 
rehearing and notifying applicant that judicial review could be had under 
statute was not sufficient to extend applicant's time for seeking judicial 
review; no active misrepresentation of date of decision relevant to time for 
review was made. Code 1975, ss 41-22-17(a, e), 41-22-20(a, d). 
[2] SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE k241.115 
356Ak241.115 
Letter advising medicaid benefit applicant of denial of her application for 
rehearing and notifying applicant that judicial review could be had under 
statute was not sufficient to extend applicant's time for seeking judicial 
review; no active misrepresentation of date of decision relevant to time for 
review was made. Code 1975, ss 41-22-17(a, e), 41-22-20(a, d). 
*538 Lawrence F. Gardella of Legal Services Corp. of Alabama, Inc., 
Montgomery, for appellant. 
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
appellees. 
INGRAM, Judge, 
his appeal arises under the Alabama Administrative Procedure Act, Ala. 
Code 1975, s 41-22-1, et seq. (act), from an administrative hearing decision by 
the Alabama *539 Medicaid Agency (agency) denying applicant's medicaid 
benefits for three months. The circuit court found that the applicant's notice 
of appeal was untimely and dismissed the appeal. The applicant now appeals to 
this court. 
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether or not the circuit court erred in 
dismissing the appeal. 
The record in pertinent part reveals that on January 16, 1987, the applicant 
was notified that she was disqualified from receiving medicaid benefits for a 
period of three months. The applicant then filed an application for rehearing 
on January 27, 1987. By letter dated March 10, 1987, the applicant was advised 
of the denial of her rehearing and notified that judicial review could be had 
under the act. On April 15, 1987, the agency received applicant's notice of 
appeal by letter dated April 9, 1987. 
[1] The applicant contends that the period of time within which she had to 
file her notice of appeal ran from March 10, 1987, the date the agency sent the 
letter notifying applicant of their decision. The agency, however, contends 
that the time to file the notice of appeal ran from the date the application 
for rehearing was deemed denied by law, February 26, 1987. 
The applicable provisions of the act are as follows: 
"(a) Any party to a contested case who deems himself aggrieved by a final 
order and who desires to have the same modified or set aside may, within 15 
days after entry of said order, file an application for rehearing, which shall 
23 
cify in detail the grounds for the relief sought therein and authorities in 
port thereof. 
• • • • 
(e) .... If the agency enters no order whatsoever regarding the application 
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hin the 30-day period, the application shall be deemed to have been denied 
of the expiration of the 30-day period. (Acts 1981, No. 81-855, p. 1534, s 
)" 
ctions 41-22-17(a) and (e). 
(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within 
agency (other than rehearing) and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a 
tested case is entitled to judicial review under this chapter. A 
liminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately 
iewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate 
edy. 
.... 
(d) The notice of appeal or review shall be filed within 30 days after the 
eipt of the notice of or other service of the final decision of the agency 
n the petitioner or, if a rehearing is requested under section 41-22-17, 
din 30 days after the decision thereon." 
ctions 41-22-20(a) and (d). 
is clear from the above provision that if the agency does not enter an 
sr within thirty days of the filing of the application for rehearing, the 
lication is deemed denied by operation of law at the expiration of the 
rty-day period. Ala. Code 1975, s 41-22-17(e). Further, the statute is 
ar that the applicant is required to file the notice of appeal within thirty 
s after the decision on the application for rehearing. Ala. Code 41-22-
i). 
re, the application for rehearing was filed on January 27, 1987, and by 
ration of law was deemed denied on February 26, 1987. Therefore, pursuant 
the act, the notice of appeal should have been filed within thirty days from 
ruary 26, 1987. As this was not done, the trial court did not err in 
tiissing the appeal. 
iitionally, we agree with the trial court's apt and concise analogy, 
h^ follows: 
Appeals from agency decisions are purely statutory, and the time 
strictions must be satisfied. Although this result may seem harsh at first 
5h, our Rules of Civil Procedure have a similar mechanism embodied in Rule 
L, A.R.Civ.P. A motion for new trial, et cetera, is deemed denied if not 
3d on within 90 days. The fact that a court may enter an order after the 90 
period ruling on the motion has no effect in determining the date that the 
Lee of appeal *540 must be filed. The order is a mere nullity. Olson 
Olson, 367 So.2d 504 (Ala.Civ.App.1979)." 
] We further note that this case is factually distinguishable from Ex 
te Four Seasons, Ltd., 450 So.2d 110 (Ala.1984). In Ex parte Four 
sons, the supreme court held that the secretary actively misrepresented in 
notice to the taxpayer that the final decision was "this date." No such 
24 
active misrepresentation occurred in the instant case. The letter dated March 
10, 1987, to the applicant simply stated that the rehearing was denied and 
vised the applicant that judicial review was pursuant to the act. 
in view of the above, it is clear that the circuit court did not err in 
dismissing the applicant's petition for review in that she failed to timely 
file her notice of appeal pursuant to the act. 
This case is due to be affirmed. 
AFFIRMED. 
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BRADLEY, P.J., and HOLMES, J., concur. 
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